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Most immigration studies have focused on migrant receiving states. By contrast, little
attention has been paid to the emigration policies of sending states. This article examines
several administrative reforms implemented in Kyrgyzstan to regulate emigration. Our
findings regarding the actual outcomes of these strategies are mixed. If some progress has
been made in defending the rights of Kyrgyz workers abroad and guaranteeing the flow of
remittances, several negative impacts can be identified. These include the reliance on
remittances and the disruption of the social fabric, especially in rural communities. We
also find that the growing “culture of emigration” undermines civic and public service
values, especially among the country’s young generation.

N

ew patterns of migration have emerged during the last two decades. First, there are
more international migrants in the world today than ever previously recorded. The UN
reports that 232 million people resided abroad worldwide in 2013, which is up from 154
million immigrants recorded in 1990 (United Nations, 2013). This trend is growing despite
the decline in job opportunities in destination countries resulting from the global recession
and the adoption of restrictive immigration measures by the key receiving countries (USA
and Western European countries) Second, former sending countries, such as South
European countries, have become receiving states, while new sending countries have
emerged – especially in Eastern Europe. Third, there is a growing number of transit
countries, both receiving and exporting workers—as illustrated by the situation in the
MENA region and in Eastern Europe. All these trends have been extensively documented
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although mostly from the perspective of receiving countries. When emigration is examined,
the main assumption is that sending states have little control of the global economic pull
factors, either at the macro or micro level. Neo-classical studies emphasize differentials in
wages and employment conditions between countries, geographic differences in the supply
of and demand for labour, as well as cost-benefit calculation by potential migrants (Harris
and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1979 and 1989; Borjas, 1999). The likelihood of emigration is
also related to the development of migrant networks (Fawcett, 1989; Gurak and Caces,
1992; Hugo, 1981; Portes and Walton, 1981; Taylor, 1986), as well as the role of private
actors (ranging from migrant-supporting NGOs to people smugglers). Lastly, the theory of
cumulative causation argues that migration tends to sustain itself over time (Massey, 1990),
leading to the emergence of permanent international flows independent from migration
policies implemented by both sending and receiving countries.
Against this theoretical background, some scholars suggest to pay more attention to
the political dimension of migration. Myron Weiner critically evaluates the traditional
economic perspectives by noting they neglect two crucial political factors: first,
“international population movements are often impelled, encouraged or prevented by
governments or political forces for reasons that may have little to do with economic
conditions,” and second, “it is governments that decide whether their citizens should be
allowed to leave and governments that decide whether immigrants should be allowed to
enter.” (Weiner, 1992/93, 96). In the same vein, Aristide Zolberg notes that macroanalytical push-pull studies “reduce migration to a unidimensional process of uneven
economic exchange between states of origin and destination.” Emphasizing the significance
of political boundaries, he thus argues “it is the political organization of contemporary
world space into mutually exclusive and legally sovereign territorial states which delineates
the specificity of international migration as a distinctive process and hence as an object of
theoretical reflection” (Zolberg, 1981, 3-4).
Scholars who share a similar interest for the role of the state in international
migration mostly focus on policies designed and implemented by receiving states, as well as
the theoretical challenges raised by the changing dynamics of immigration (Meyers, 2000;
Portes, 1997; Zolberg, 1999, 1989). By contrast, little attention has been paid to sendingstates emigration policies, implying they either do not exist or do not matter. This lacuna is
puzzling for at least three empirical reasons. First, emigration policies matter equally, if not
more, than immigration policies. Although it is the policies of receiving countries that
determine whether migration can take place, these policies are framed in response to
migration flows that obviously depend on the policies pursued by sending countries. Exit
and entry policies are two sides of the same coin. Second, the increasing number of illegal
immigrants in some parts of the world clearly illustrates the limitations of immigration
policies. Contrary to what Bhagwati (1984) has predicted, “disincentives” imposed by the
destination countries affect emigration “incentives” less than expected. Third, there is
evidence of a growing number of countries that are implementing a pro-active strategy of
manpower export while attempting to limit illegal flows. As acknowledged by the UN
General Assembly, “many countries have developed innovative policies and programs to
engage their expatriate communities in the development process, to enhance regional
collaboration and consultation and to reduce the transfer costs of remittances” (UN, 2011,
2). This trend is fuelled by the policies and politics of emigration in sending countries. It is
worth noting that the proportion of governments wishing to decrease emigration has
remained virtually unchanged since 1986. By contrast, in 2006, eleven countries reported
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their plans to increase emigration1 while only four countries were concerned about the loss
of highly skilled workers (UN, 2006). As Nancy Green notes, all these trends suggest the
necessity of “reversing the immigration paradigm” by focusing on the “politics of exit.”
(2005) Aristide Zolberg reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis of the “exit revolution.”
(2007)
Few models of emigration dynamics have been developed and some of them
include political factors (Ostergaad-Nielsen, 2003; Schmitter Heisler, 1985). Yet, very little
has been written about the explicit role of the state in sending countries. Among the few
notable exceptions, Laurie A. Brand explores the relationship between the government of
four sending states in the Middle East (Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan) and the outmovement of their citizens. She frames her research design around one key issue, the role of
sovereignty in explaining sending state behaviour, and finds that the “nature of sovereignty
in the international system is being reconfigured …by the presence of substantial expatriate
communities actively leading transnational lives” (2006, 222-223). Analyzing Arab
migration to Europe, Philippe Fargues provides some evidence that Arab sending countries
are not “just passive witnesses in the face of their own citizens' emigration” (2004, 1349).
David Fitzgerald examines the case of Mexico and demonstrates that for most of the
twentieth century, the Mexican federal government had a clear, if ineffective, policy to
control what types of people left, where they came from, when they left, and the conditions
of their exit and return (2006, 282).” Other recent studies that account for the role of
emigration policy include countries as diverse as Lithuania after its accession to the EU
(Thaut, 2009), and China (Biao, 2003).
Beyond their different perspectives, all these studies assume emigration matters.
Processes of emigration control have been developed, using either positive or negative
incentives, and have included both unskilled and skilled workers. Extending on these
studies, we seek to identify the key components of an “emigration regime.” Such a regime,
as illustrated by Table 1, includes some basic elements like permission to travel (through
the deliverance of passports and exit visas), and institutions dealing with expatriate
community affairs, such as embassies and consulates. In addition, and more importantly
from our perspective, an emigration regime encompasses a pro-active labour export
dimension allegedly designed to meet a destination country’s demand for labour and to
address domestic socio-economic issues, such as a high level of unemployment and poverty.
On that basis, we evaluate the impact of such a regime through the particular
example of Kyrgyzstan. The study of the Kyrgyz governmental policy of exporting labour
force provides useful insights about the motives and strategies of sending countries in their
effort to maximize the benefits of migration. The case study of Kyrgyzstan is important for
emigration research for at least two reasons. First, a large portion of its economic survival
relies on remittances, providing a strong incentive for the government to pursue an “active”
policy of emigration. Second, Kyrgyzstan is a young democracy trying to consolidate its
public and political institutions while experiencing an accelerating emigration process. This
raises the question of whether these two goals are conflicting or not. We argue that
Kyrgyzstan has significantly improved its management of labour export. Yet, our findings
regarding the actual outcomes of this strategy are mixed. If some progress has been made in
promoting the rights of Kyrgyz workers abroad and guaranteeing the flow of remittances,
several negative impacts can be identified. We analyse specifically four issues: the effect of
1

The list included: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand,
Tunisia, Tuvalu, Viet Nam and Yemen.
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“brain-drain;” the addiction to remittances; the disruption of social fabric in rural
communities; and domestic political tensions caused by emigrants.
Table 1. Key Components of an Emigration Regime
Exit control
- passport regulation
- visa system
- bilateral agreements with countries of destination
- domestic legislation designed to manage emigration (including
dual citizenship)
Institutions
- public institutions
- private agencies controlled by the state
Labor export
- training
strategy
- marketing workers abroad
Actions abroad
- relationship with expatriates
- return packages

Kyrgyzstan: From unregulated emigration to selective emigration
Kyrgyzstan, like many former Soviet republics, has become a sending country during the
1990s. The first wave of emigration took place in 1991 after its independence. High-skilled
workers of German descent migrated to the newly re-unified Germany, while Russia
became the destination of Slavic ethnic minorities. Emigration flows decreased between
1995 and 1999, mostly as a result of the economic and financial crisis in Russia. After a
sharp decline in 2001, emigration flows increased again and remained mostly unregulated
despite the presidential decree on the Border Control Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic in
1999, as well as the adoption by the parliament of the 2000 Law on External Migration. 2
These measures were security-driven, targeting terrorist transnational activities as well as
illegal immigration and human trafficking, and did not address the problem of labour
emigration. In 2006, the Kyrgyz government began the process of issuing a new type of
passports that could meet international security standards, such as biometrics identifications.
The use of new passports was further justified by the necessity to combat criminal groups
engaged in human trafficking. Legal emigration, actually, reached a new peak in 2007
(Figure 1). Since then, Kyrgyzstan has actively supplied a labour force to Russia,
Kazakhstan and other countries, as well as Turkey and South Korea. According to various
estimates, more than 500,000 citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic are working abroad (either
legally or illegally); more than a half work in Russia; 50,000 to 80,000 work in Kazakhstan,
while the rest work in other countries.
Components of the Kyrgyz emigration regime
Extending work from previous studies, we identity the key motives of what constitutes
today an emigration regime; these are listed in Table 2.
Confronted with the inevitability of workers’ outflows resulting from the national economic
2

Under the terms of the 1999 presidential decree, the Border Control Agency became a part
of both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of National Security. Its main
responsibilities, according to the Law on National Borders and the Law on External
Migration, include the prevention of illegal border crossing, and the protection of the
territory from military intrusion and terrorist activities.
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conditions and political instability, the Kyrgyz government tried to regulate it in order to
increase the benefits of emigration for both the state and migrants. Hence changes have
been introduced in exit and entry management, as illustrated by a series of bilateral
agreements concluded with countries of destination. In 2007, a special commission for the
“optimization of managing migration” was created as a result of the cooperation between
the Kyrgyz government and the Federal Migration Agency of Russia. Working quotas for
the Kyrgyz migrants in Russia are negotiated at the government level. Working visa
programs were advanced with the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of South Korea.
These programs are managed by the Center on Kyrgyz Citizens Employment Abroad,
which has several regional offices where Kyrgyzstani nationals are selected and trained for
improving their skills for the labour markets of foreign countries.3

Figure 1. Emigration from Kyrgyzstan from 1995 to 2010

Source: The National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2011a)

Table 2. Motives explaining the development of an emigration regime
Socio-economic
Political
3

Under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Migration (MLEM), the
Center works in cooperation with the Korean consulate since March 2011. It conducts
Korean language proficiency exams and two-weeks training program for the selected
candidates. The cost of the program is U.S. $24. The participants are required to go through
a proficiency exam. After passing the exam, candidates have to qualify for a work contract
under the bilateral program. All participants require medical examination as well.
According to the MLEM, a total of 1,141 workers were selected to work in South Korea
from 2007 to 2011. See http://www.24kg.org/community/96434-s-nachala-2011-goda-vyuzhnuyu-koreyu-vyexalo.html.
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- Alleviate socio-economic
pressures
(demographic
growth, high unemployment,
poverty)
- Secure remittances flows
- Protect rights of migrants
abroad
- Secure employment for
migrants abroad
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- Management of border
controls
- Assertion of state control
over expatriates
- Partnership with countries
of destination
- Fight against illegal
immigration
- Fight against human
trafficking

In addition to bilateral partners, international institutions, such as the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), assists the Kyrgyz government in regulating
emigration.4 These bilateral and international initiatives are part of a new pro-active strategy
designed to achieve efficient implementation of policies of labour migration. In its 2010-14
State Program on Decent Labour, the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Migration
(MLEM) highlights that given the high level unemployment rate in Kyrgyzstan, the only
feasible solution to accommodate the growing population is to conduct a well-organized
policy by improving relations with the countries of destination. 5 The Ministry highlighted
two main objectives: a) to increase opportunities for emigration by improving skill
competitiveness and diversifying the geography of migration destination; and b) to develop
state sponsored social and economic programs to assist Kyrgyzstani nationals residing
abroad.6
Institutional reforms, both in the public and private sectors, have been
implemented in order to achieve these goals. In addition to public institutions recently
created (such as the Centre on Kyrgyz Citizens Employment abroad), the MLEM has
reorganized its priorities, which now include monitoring the labour markets overseas and
developing contracts with employers in companies overseas, among other responsibilities.
Kyrgyzstan is also developing new instruments designed to market its human resources and
to identify the needs of the labour markets of receiving countries. 7 Efforts to train
competitive workers are part of the reform of the vocational education system conducted
with the support of receiving countries. In 2011, for example, the Russian Technological
University of Kazan created a “teaching division” in a Kyrgyz school of vocational training
located in Kant. The division offers a vocational training for students based on the Russian
standards. In addition, in 2011, the Kyrgyz government signed an agreement with the

4

See http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/kyrgyzstan.
The Country Program of the Kyrgyz Republic on Decent Labor (Национальная
Программа Кыргызской Республики по Достойному Труду на 2010-2014 годы)
6
See http://www.mz.kg/ru/program/.
7
In addition, there are private employment agencies, which collect information about
foreign labor markets; yet, their resources are still insufficient to play an important role as
intermediaries in the labor market (Musabaeva, 2008 104).
- 197 http://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol20/iss2/6
6
5

d’Appollonia and Kasymova: How and Why Emigration Matters: Examining the Emergence of New “E
d’Appollonia and Kasymova

How and Why Emigration Matters

Rossotrudnichestvo8 on vocational schools designed to train potential emigrants in seven
regions in Kyrgyzstan.9 Furthermore, the Kyrgyz government develops on-site services and
resource centres abroad, as well as works closely with private employment agencies. For
example, in 2009, about 15 private agencies received accreditation by the MLEM.
Protecting the rights of Kyrgyz nationals working abroad constitutes a new
component of the emigration regime. This task is shared by the MLEM and other
ministries.10 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs registers migrant workers and tries to monitor
their situation abroad through Kyrgyz diplomatic channels -- especially in Russia, which
hosts the largest number of Kyrgyzstani migrants. The government is establishing several
new consulates in Russia, and has upgraded its consulate in the Republic of Korea to the
level of embassy.11 A proposal is being considered in the parliament to create a position of
a labour attaché at several Kyrgyz Embassies. However, the task of protecting migrant
workers is not easy to achieve, for at least two reasons. First, a large number of Kyrgyz
citizens work illegally in Russia and, thus, do not enjoy either social rights from their
Russian employers or diplomatic protection. Therefore, they face restrictive regulations
related to illegal immigrants introduced by the Russian government (such as the 2002 Law
on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation) with no legal assistance,
notably when it comes to appeal court decisions of deportation.
Second, Russian employers often do not respect the rights of migrant workers and
fail to comply with the national legislation when issuing working permits to foreigners.
Kyrgyz workers, who have limited language and legal trainings, are not able to protect
themselves against employers’ abusive practices (such as non-payment of wages, debt
bondage, restrictions on freedom, and sexual exploitation). The Kyrgyz government, aware
of its current limited capabilities of helping its nationals, is therefore encouraging the
involvement of various organizations created by the Kyrgyz diaspora. According to
Kginfo.ru, a website launched by the Kyrgyz community in Russia, there are about 40
organizations providing social and legal assistance to emigrants facing different types of
emergencies.12 For example, the Zamandash Association, which regroups Kyrgyz nationals
residing in Russia and Kazakhstan, provided legal and financial support to 80 citizens of
Kyrgyzstan who have been victims of human trafficking between January and March
2011.13 The Zamandash Association also works closely with the MLEM and, in 2011, has
submitted a recommendation to establish a separate committee at the Parliament of
Kyrgyzstan that could deal with issues related emigration. 14 The “Zamandash Journal”,
created in 2004, reflects the views of the Kyrgyz diaspora worldwide on every issue related
to current affairs in Kyrgyzstan (Wood, 2006).15
8

Rossotrudnichestvo (Россотрудничество) is the Russian Federal Agency on issues of
Community of Independent States and Russian citizens residing abroad, and international
humanitarian cooperation
9
http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=18988.
10
MLEM has been reorganized in early 2012. The reform increased the role of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in dealing with migration issues. However, it is premature to evaluate the
impact of this reform on the management of workers abroad.
11
See www.mfa.kg, March 27, 2011
12
See http://kginfo.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1069&Itemid=1.
13
See http://www.kib.kg/news/view/id/3605
14
Ibis
15
In general, the Kyrgyz diaspora, especially in Russia, is viewed to be better organized than
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Strengthening relations with the Kyrgyz diaspora is politically and financially
motivated as well. Political parties are interested in utilizing the voting power of the Kyrgyz
diaspora; in turn, Kyrgyz citizens residing abroad tend to vote for the candidates concerned
about emigration problems. As a result, the political system is being increasingly influenced
by both the civic mobilization of emigrants and by political parties that include the concerns
of emigrant constituency into their political platform. This trend is illustrated by the
evolution of Ar Namys, one the five largest and active parties in Kyrgyzstan. 16 Its platform
for the 2010 election emphasized that given the high level of corruption and economic
weaknesses in the country, many citizens of Kyrgyzstan have no choice but “vote with their
feet.” Ar Namys thus suggested to create special centres that facilitate the socialization and
adaptation of labour migrants and to improve bilateral agreements to assist migrants, among
other things.
Financial motivations relate to the crucial issue of regulating remittances.
According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the amount of
remittances to Kyrgyzstan increased from $322 million in 2005 to $715 million in 2010.
Transfers have acquired a tremendous importance for the economic stability of the country
(from 13 percent of the gross domestic product in 2005 to 19 percent in 2010). Hence the
government is implementing policies to increase remittance flows, promote transfers
through formal channels, and reduce the cost of transfers. The measures taken include
improved access to banking services for senders and receivers of remittances, and
cooperation with countries of destination, as illustrated by the agreement on “interest-free
remittances” concluded in 2009 with the Russian Federation and the JSC UNISTREAM
Bank.17
According to the Kyrgyz representative at the 100 th session of the IOM Council in
December 2011, all these initiatives illustrate that “a distinct state migration policy is being
built up and implemented in a constant interaction between government agencies, partner
NGOs, media and international organizations.” The delegate noted that the “policy is based
on the admittance that migration is an objective process” and that the main task is “to
extract the maximum benefit for both the individual and a society as a whole.” 18
Critical evaluation of the Kyrgyz emigration regime
Yet, the Kyrgyz emigration regime undergoes severe limitations. Firstly, like many other
developing countries, Kyrgyzstan lacks the institutional capacities to effectively monitor its
domestic labour market, as well as the needs of foreign labour markets. Like other
governmental initiatives, changes introduced to emigration policy have not produced the
expected positive outcomes, at least as of 2012. In this field, as well as in other policy
spaces, there is still a lack of adequate institutional frameworks, and limited capacity and
diasporas from other central Asian countries, although worse than other nationalities which
have been living in Russia throughout many generations (OSCE, 2009).
16
During the 2010 parliamentary elections, Ar Namys received 25 seats (out of 120) in the
Parliament and thus became the third largest party in 2010.
17
See http://unistream.ru.
18
Statement of the Kyrgyzstan Delegation, 100 th session of the Council, IOM, December
2011. Source:
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/council/100/Kyrgyz
stan-Statement-100th-Council.pdf
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skills to design and implement new measures (Baimyrzaeva, 2011).
Secondly, motivations to emigrate remain largely independent from official
initiatives, despite the increasing involvement of the government in the management of
emigration. The Development Fund of the Institute of Eurasian Studies conducted a survey
among 200 migrants in 2006. Almost 56 percent of migrants reported that they learn about
employment opportunities abroad from relatives and neighbours. 19 Ruget and Usmanalieva
(2010, 449) also confirmed in their study on Kyrgyz emigrants that migration is frequently a
result of a network effect: “Many follow a family member, an acquaintance, and in a few
other cases a recruiter.” As a result, emigration flows remain mostly unorganized.
According to various estimates, more than 80 percent of migrant workers on yearly average
leave the country through unofficial channels.20 According to the MLEM, the government
needs to create a research institute in order to collect reliable data on emigration flows and
conduct a door-to-door account of the population. 21
Thirdly, there is some evidence that governmental efforts focusing on the export of
skilled workers are not producing the expected outcomes. This strategy relies on the
assumption that skilled migrants are better paid, better protected from exploitation, and able
to send larger amounts of remittances. According to the Statistical Committee of
Kyrgyzstan, a majority of workers who left Kyrgyzstan between 1998 and 2005 completed
secondary education (as illustrated by Table 3). In 2002, about 35 percent of migrants
reported to complete university degree.
Table 3. Education levels among Kyrgyz immigrants
1998

2002

2005

13.43%

34.78%

20.89%

2.31%

5.75%

4.72%

Secondary special

25.55%

26.85%

21.50%

Secondary

49.61%

24.59%

46.86%

4.55%

4.15%

3.47%

1.89%

University level
Incomplete University

Incomplete secondary
Basic general

6.33%
…

Elementary

2.75%

…

No elementary education

…

0.69%

0.31%

Illiterate

…

0.37%

0.14%

Not indicated

…

1.13%

19

…

http://www.ea-studies.ru/news/156.html
Emigrants leave Kyrgyzstan both through the airport and train stations. When crossing the
border at the airport, detailed information is given such as reasons for travels and passport
information, although this information is often used only internally. When crossing the
border by a car or the train, identification documents are checked, but this information is not
recorded (OSCE, 2009, 27).
21
This view been expressed by the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Migration, which
planned to request a funding for an in-depth study of emigration. For more information, see
http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2011/03/18/feature-01.
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Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2011a)
Kyrgyz workers, who are employed in Russia and Kazakhstan, remain in lowskilled, low-paid, and undervalued employment sectors. There are thus some discrepancies
between the educational achievement of Kyrgyz migrants and the skills and qualifications
demanded by foreign labour markets. Two interrelated factors explain this situation. First,
highly skilled migrants have to compete with citizens of receiving states and are often
forced to accept unskilled jobs. Second, job qualifications of Kyrgyzstani workers are not
recognized in foreign countries due to educational differences. According to Anar
Musabaeva, about 33 percent of Kyrgyz emigrants to Russia, and 19 percent of Kyrgyz
workers in Kazakhstan, had to be retrained in the workplace (2008, 105).
The Kyrgyz government is aware of these limitations and intends to address them
on the assumption that emigration provides opportunities for economic growth and
prosperity. This assumption is supported by the 2010-2014 Kyrgyz State Program on
Decent Labour. The Program notes that given current unemployment rate in Kyrgyzstan, the
only feasible solution to accommodate the growing population is to conduct a wellorganized policy in regulating relations with countries receiving labour migrants from
Kyrgyzstan.22 Throughout the last five years the population of the Kyrgyz Republic has
been increasing for 1.5 percent reaching over 5.2 mln. The annual pressure to the labour
market ranges from 200,000 to 250,000 working age population, which is beyond the
national economy’s capacity to “absorb” it (County Program on Decent Labour 2010-2014).
The proportion of the working age population has increased from 57.8 percent in 2005 to
61.1 percent in 2011. As a result, throughout the last six years the supply of the labour has
been exceeding the demand for labour at a rate of 32 percent 23.
Based on the Kyrgyz households survey conducted by the National Statistical
Committee, the unemployment rate in Kyrgyzstan reported to be at 12 percent (Table 4).
But, the official rate of unemployment is often understated. For example, the survey
conducted by MLEM in 2008 reports the national unemployment rate to be at 16.8 percent.
MLEM survey also notes, that those who were employed reported to be working in the
informal sector of the economy (67 percent) or were self-employed (Country Program on
Decent Labour 2010-1214). The youth belong to 40 percent of unemployed and the
residents of rural areas represent 58.7 percent of unemployed. 24 Other institutions, which are
not related to the government, report even higher unemployment figures. The US State
Department, for example, estimated the 2010 national unemployment rate to be at 20
percent.25
Table 4. Official unemployment rate in percent
Percent of unemployed
22

1995

2000

2005

2010

2011

5.70%

7.80%

8.10%

8.60%

12%

The
2010 report of the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Migration:
http://www.mz.kg/Otchet2010
23
The 2011 Report of the Ministry of Labor Employment and Migration:
http://www.mz.kg/Otchet2011
24
The 2011 Report of the Ministry of Labor Employment and Migration:
http://www.mz.kg/Otchet2011
25
Please see: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5755.htm#econ
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Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2011b)
According to the National Statistical Committee, close to 93,000 residents of
Kyrgyzstan were officially recorded as unemployed in 2011. However, most unemployed
do not register because unemployment benefits are negligible. In 2005, the government
initiated a comprehensive medium-term poverty reduction and economic growth strategy
with the support of international financial institutions. Bishkek agreed to pursue a tax
reform and, in 2006, became eligible for the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)
initiative. GDP grew about 8 percent annually in 2007-08, partly due to increased prices for
its key export commodities (such as gold), but slowed to 2.9 percent in 2009. The political
crisis in April 2010 and subsequent ethnic clashes severely damaged the economy, causing
GDP to contract by 1.4 percent in 2010. That year, an estimated 33.7 percent of the
population still lived below the poverty line (compared with 52 percent in 2003). 26 Despite
the reduction of overall poverty level, factors affecting socio-economic development
include high income distribution inequality in society; lack of public resources to implement
social programs due to low revenue collection rate; and poor targeting of existing public
social programs.27 Furthermore, the country is highly vulnerable to fuel prices, as well as
natural disasters. Emigration cannot provide a sustainable solution to all these challenges,
despite increased remittances.
As noted by the IMF, “takings of considerable cash amount from labour migrants
and ‘shuttles’ from abroad are the only livelihood for many families and their relatives.
These funds restrain lowering of the living standards of the population as a whole, as well
as wide spreading of poverty, and serve as additional source and channel of currency flow
into the republic” (p.73). Analyzing the positive linkage between remittances and
development, the World Bank estimated that cash flows decreased both poverty (from 64
percent to 40 percent) and extreme poverty (from 23 percent to 9 percent) during the period
1999 to 2006.28 Other estimates indicate that a 10 percent increase in per capita official
remittances may lead to a 3.5 percent decline in the number of poor people.29 At the micro
level, however, it is far from evident that remittances improve the socio-economic
conditions of the poorest families, notably in terms of school enrolment and health
outcomes for the children (Anderson and Kroeger, 2012). At the macro level, amount of
funds received from labour migrants has begun exceeding sums necessary to cover vital
necessities. However, appropriate conditions and prerequisites for using them as
investments for funding economic reforms have not been created yet at the state level.
Despite the initiatives included in the Financial Market Development Strategy for 2007-10,
the role of the banking system in advancing the economic growth is still insignificant and
rather low compared to the other countries. As a result, twenty years after gaining its
26

See http://www.undp.kg/en/what-we-do/focus-areas/poverty-reduction.
See
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/85673/devdebates/ECA/mogilevskiy.pdf. The
global 2007/2008 Human Development Report ranks Kyrgyzstan at 122 with a Human
Development Index of 0.694 noting the regional and urban/ rural disparities as well as
inequalities between men and women.
28
The Kyrgyz Republic: Recent Economic Developments, December 2007, World Bank,
p.6
29
Ratha D, Leveraging Remittances for Development, June 2007, Migration Policy Institute
retrieved at http://www.migrationpolicy.org. See also Mansoor A, Quillin, B. Migration and
Remittances: Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union, WB, 2006 p. 8.
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independence, Kyrgyzstan remains the second poorest of the former Soviet republics and
one of the poorest in the World (World Bank, 2010).
Table 5. Annual remittance transfers to Kyrgyzstan 2005-2011 (thsd U.S. dollars)
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Inflow

297.7

470.0

688.2

1,205.5

966.7

1,252.6

1,695.4

CIS countries

262.8

436.7

648.8

1,141.4

894.4

1,199.3

1,639.4

Kazakhstan

0.2

0.0

7.0

27.9

31.4

35.0

41.2

Russia

262.6

436.6

641.8

1,113.5

862.9

1,164.3

1,597.5

Others

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.7

Foreign countries

34.9

33.4

39.4

64.1

72.3

53.3

56.0

Belgium

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.5

0.5

0.2

1.4

Great Britain

0.9

0.9

0.9

1.8

1.4

1.4

1.5

Germany

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.7

9.9

15.7

USA

33.9

32.2

38.3

61.4

69.5

41.7

36.1

0.1

1.3

Others
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.2
0.3
Source: The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (2011)

Remittances continue rising as emigration flows remain high. In 2011, the amount
of remittances transfer to Kyrgyzstan was the highest, exceeding one billion and a half US
dollar. The largest amount of remittances originates from Russia (Table 5). As a result,
remittances represent an increasing percentage of GDP, as illustrated by figure 2 – a trend
that may turn Kyrgyzstan into “a potential remittance addicted” country (Ababakirov:
2008).
Figure 2. Correlation of remittances and GDP
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Furthermore, some studies highlight that remittances create a “culture of
migration” in migrant sending countries, whereby young people would see the apparent
rewards of migration and place unrealistic expectations on moving abroad, which develops
a disincentive to working in their home countries. As a result, a seasonal emigration can
have the potential for turning into permanent emigration (Koser, 2007, 46-47). According
to a survey conducted by GALLUP in 2010, 32 percent of Kyrgyzstanis express interest in
emigrating temporarily and 18 percent of Kyrgyzstanis desire to emigrate permanently. 30
The sense of “temporariness” of living in Kyrgyzstan has a negative influence on civic
commitment. Given the weak social security system in the country, an increasing number of
workers seek for welfare benefits abroad and thus develop a pragmatic approach to
citizenship. For example, in 2010, 270,000 Kyrgyz workers became Russian citizens in
order to secure long-term gains such as pensions and health care benefits. The “culture of
migration” also precludes significant progress in the reform of the public sector by
undermining motivation for high performance and good governance as well as providing a
fertile ground for corruption. 31
Another negative consequence of migration relates to outflow of migrants from
certain industries and sectors. Emigration of the “best and brightest” workers may benefit
the diasporas as “a source of and facilitator of trade, investment of ideas; a rich vein of
remittances; and a potential stock of high human capital returnee migrants (Desai at al,
2009, 33).” However, in the long run, a country may experience a shortage of skilled
workers in certain sectors. Recently, the outflow of workers from medical and education
sectors has become a major source of concern in Kyrgyzstan. These occupations are still
subsidized by the state; hence, there is a fiscal burden of higher taxes and lower spending on
“those left behind” (Desai et al, 2009, 33), in addition to the low quality of education and
provision of health care for future generation. For example, in Jalal-Abad (one of the seven
regions of Kyrgyzstan) “almost 1000 teachers have left the school for external employment
in 2008. That same year, 11 young specialists who arrived to the oblast within the state
program which supports young professional, quitted their jobs and left for Russia and
neighbouring countries” (OECE, 2009, 50). A similar situation is observed with respect to
medical professionals. This is due to the fact that the wages in the health care sector is
relatively low in Kyrgyzstan, while the demand for doctors has been continuously
increasing in Russia (Ruget and Usmanalieva, 2010, 449)
Finally, emigration generates negative impacts on the social fabric of Kyrgyz
society, notably in the rural communities. With regards to the traditional family structure,
the consequences are twofold. First, emigration tends to perpetuate gender inequalities
when wives of emigrants have to take up male responsibilities in the household, without the
authority or respect accorded to men. Many women are left at the mercy of their husband’s
parents who remain the principal recipients of remittances, as illustrated by Table 6.
Second, as the rate of emigration is becoming higher for women than for men in many
regions, elderly people are often in charge of the children left behind. The burden of taking
care of children is not only financial, but also psychological. Addressing the issue of the
30

Gallup, 2010. http://www.gallup.com/poll/141746/million-cis-migrate-temporarily-workstudy.aspx.
31
Despite the adoption of several anti-corruption laws, the pervasive nature of corruption
remains unchanged.
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emergence of a “skipped generation” in Kyrgyzstan, Trilling (2010) notes that “old people
can’t give a child what he [or she] needs for proper development. They are from a different
generation...those kids will not be so prepared and educated culturally and intellectually. In
the end, they may be estranged from their parents and feel morally abandoned” (Trilling,
2010).
Table 6. Key Recipients of Remittances in Kyrgyzstan
Recipients
Parents

Share in Total Number of Recipients %
62

Husband/Wife

21

Sister/Brother

4

Children

2

Other relatives

2

Total
100
Source: OECD, 2009
The disruption of family structure also affects the welfare of the children. Child
poverty exceeds the average national poverty level in all CIS countries. Given the absence
of parental control, children often do not attend school and lack access to basic social
services (Abdrazakova, 2010). In addition, the population located in rural areas with a high
rate of emigration is carrying an increasing burden of ill health associated with poverty,
with a rise in the prevalence of diseases such as Tuberculosis (TB). Inadequate water supply
and poor sanitary literacy among people are some of the reasons for high intestinal infection
rates, particularly among children.32
Conclusion
In 2003, the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrants and Members of Their Families came into force. Kyrgyzstan ratified the
agreement along with many other migrant sending counties, but none of the migrants
receiving countries, including Russia and Kazakhstan joined the Convention. This
ultimately makes this international agreement ineffective. In order to move from a “chaotic
emigration” to a more organized emigration process, Kyrgyzstan needs acting within the
international migration governance framework. Some steps have been taken in the regional
contest, in particular, addressing emigration issues within regional organizations such as the
Shanghai Organization of Cooperation and the Organization of the Collective Security
Treaty as well as bilaterally.33
The potential tension between sending countries and receiving states is
problematic. A high level of dependence of the country on emigrants’ employment in third
countries makes a manpower sending country even more vulnerable both in economic and
political terms. Russia, the major receiving country in the region, tends to use this

32

See the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Plan 20102011, p.1.
33
Please
see
:http://www.24kg.org/community/95482-almasbek-abytov-dve-pyatyxnaseleniya-kyrgyzstana.html
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vulnerability in its relation with sending countries. 34 From the economic perspective,
concerns relate to sustainability of the employment opportunities in Russia on the one hand,
and the effects of “brain drain” in Kyrgyzstan on the other hand. 35 Therefore, the
implementation of an “active” emigration policy by sending countries is often constrained
by asymmetric relations with the major countries of destination. The most feasible
alternative for developing a sustainable emigration policy framework for Kyrgyzstan should
be membership in regional organizations. All Kyrgyzstan’s neighbours are also migrantsending countries, Kazakhstan excepted. Kyrgyzstan thus shares common interest with
other immigrant sending countries in the region, which are advancing their emigration
policies as well. Sharing common interests could potentially strengthen negotiating power
of all immigrant-sending countries in the region if they worked in a cooperative manner.
Yet, currently, there is no regional cooperation effective enough to negotiate a more
sustainable migration policy with recipient countries, specifically Russia.
This article highlighted several negative effects of emigration on the social fabric
in Kyrgyzstan. However, the most significant of it is the emergence of a “culture of
emigration” which undermines the civic and public service values, especially among the
country’s young generation. Also, a high emigration rate disenfranchises the poorest from
the political process, a condition that is not conducive for addressing the problems of poor
governance, corruption, and opaqueness of government operations.
The long-term effect of the current emigration policy is yet to be analyzed. What
should deserve further attention in the study of the emergence of “active” emigration
regimes are changes in policies and public administration agenda over time. Exporting
workers in order to secure remittances while dealing with the challenges of democratic
consolidation seem to fuel a series of conflicting spill-over outcomes. How Kyrgyzstan will
try to better coordinate its migration management policies with other societal and
institutional priorities may provide useful insights for a better understanding of the “exit
revolution.” Can the development of emigration policies create triangular networks
involving the connection between the government and workers abroad, the connection
between workers abroad and the authorities of the receiving countries, and the relation
between the Kyrgyz government and governments of receiving countries? If so, can this
create a “win-win” situation for all the actors involved by helping sending countries to
strengthen their negotiation power? Or does an organized labor export only become a
substitute for illegal immigration? Knowing that politics fuels policies, what are the actual
incentives of the Kyrgyz government to reverse brain drain – compare to the option of
externalizing pressing issues such as unemployment by exporting part of its population? An
alternative scenario would be to invest in job creation, education, economic growth and
34

For example, the Tajikistani authorities have imprisoned a Russian pilot in November
2011. In the same month the Russian authorities began a crackdown on and deportation of
the Tajik illegal migrants. Although any connection between the case of the Russian pilot
and the crackdown on Tajiks in Russia was denied, commentators suggested that the
deportation was a reaction for the imprisonment of the Russian pilot.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/europe/russia-rounding-up-tajikworkers.html?pagewanted=all
35
According to some economic calculation every third of the working age Kyrgyzstanis is
employed
in
the
labor
market
of
other
countries.
Please
see
http://www.24kg.org/economics/122801-arsen-imankulov-kazhdyj-tretijtrudosposobnyj.html
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poverty alleviation – as illustrated by strategies adopted in South Asian countries in order to
implement circular migration schemes. It may be worthwhile to explore these options by
focusing on the links between emigration and development, emigration and
democratisation, as well as emigration and “fair multilateralism” through a more integrated
and comparative approach to migration.
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